Laser Probes, Rowhammer and Firmware Glitches Highlight Persistent Hardware‑Level Risks
What Happened – At the Hardwear.io conference in Amsterdam (Nov 20 2026) researchers demonstrated a range of physical‑attack techniques that can subvert the security guarantees of modern chips and firmware. Charles Christen (Ledger Donjon) used a precision laser to fault the open‑source TROPIC01 secure element, then loaded and executed arbitrary firmware even though the device was in its “fully hardened” state. In parallel, a competition‑style “HardPwn” exercise exposed roughly 20 new flaws across a spectrum of devices, from Cisco networking gear to medical infusion pumps and Volkswagen transporters.
Alejandro Vázquez showcased “Behemoth,” a Ghidra‑based platform that automates UEFI‑firmware vulnerability hunting with AI assistance; the tool produced a working exploit for a Microsoft‑released firmware patch within two days. Researchers also revisited the classic Rowhammer attack, confirming that 28 % of recent DDR4 modules remain exploitable despite vendor mitigations.
The conference’s hands‑on labs gave participants direct access to enterprise‑grade routers, switches, and wireless APs supplied by Cisco, enabling real‑world fault‑injection and side‑channel experiments that would otherwise be out of reach for most security teams. While many of the disclosed issues are still under validation, Cisco’s on‑site triage team began coordinating bug‑bounty payouts as the findings emerged.
Medical device research was a highlight: Code White’s Florian Hauser and Fabian Weber performed a red‑team engagement on a connected infusion pump, extracting the device’s server software, building a custom kernel, and demonstrating remote code execution that could increase drug dosage by tenfold. The vendor declined to be named, and no public patch status is known.
Across the board, presenters noted a recurring pattern: vendors often claim fixes without fully eliminating the underlying design flaws, and the physical nature of hardware attacks—laser fault injection, X‑ray analysis, and Rowhammer—means that traditional software‑only testing misses critical attack surfaces. Professor Kaveh Razavi (ETH Zurich) warned that the escalating cost and expertise required for comprehensive hardware security research make collaborative, multi‑institution efforts essential.
Why It Matters for Trust & Control Assurance – The findings stress the need for continuous, evidence‑driven verification of hardware and firmware controls, a control objective that maps to multiple frameworks (e.g., NIST CSF 2.0).
Who Is Affected – IoT device manufacturers, networking equipment vendors, medical‑device makers, automotive OEMs, and any organization that deploys off‑the‑shelf hardware in critical environments.
Recommended Actions –
- Incorporate hardware‑level threat modeling into your risk assessments.
- Deploy continuous firmware‑integrity monitoring and secure boot verification across all endpoints.
- Establish a formal process for third‑party hardware security testing, including physical fault‑injection assessments.
- Track remediation of disclosed vulnerabilities through a centralized control‑mapping repository.
Technical Notes –
- Attack vectors: laser fault injection, Rowhammer (DRAM disturbance), AI‑assisted UEFI firmware analysis, physical probing of secure elements.
- Affected components: TROPIC01 secure element, Cisco routers/switches, Microsoft UEFI firmware, DDR4 DRAM modules, unnamed medical infusion pump controller.
- Tools referenced: Ghidra, Behemoth AI‑assisted analysis platform, custom laser‑glitch rigs.
- No CVEs were assigned at the time of reporting; many findings remain under validation.
Source: DataBreachToday – Laser Probes and Rowhammer at Hardwear.io Conference

