TeleMessage TM SGNL Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default Vulnerability

TeleMessage TM SGNL Exposure of Core Dump File to an Unauthorized Control Sphere Vulnerability

The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 implements authentication through a long-lived credential (e.g., not a token with a short expiration time) that can be reused at a later…

The admin panel in the TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 allows attackers to discover usernames, e-mail addresses, passwords, and telephone numbers

The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 relies on the client side (e.g., the TM SGNL app) to do MD5 hashing, and then accepts the hash as the authentication credential

The TeleMessage archiving backend through 2025-05-05 accepts API calls (to request an authentication token) from the TM SGNL (aka Archive Signal) app with the credentials of…

The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 relies on MD5 for password hashing, which opens up various attack possibilities (including rainbow tables) with low computational effort

The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 stores certain cleartext information in memory, even though memory content may be accessible to an adversary through various avenues