Zero‑Day SSRF (CVE‑2026‑92203) in Airbyte SharePoint Connector Enables Information Disclosure
What It Is — Airbyte’s open‑source SharePoint connector contains a server‑side request forgery (SSRF) flaw in the _get_shared_drive_object method. An attacker who can authenticate to the Airbyte instance can craft a malicious URI that forces the service account to issue arbitrary outbound requests, leading to internal information disclosure.
Exploitability — The vulnerability is publicly disclosed as a 0‑day (CVE‑2026‑92203) with a CVSS 7.7 (High). Exploitation requires a valid Airbyte user account, but no additional privileges. No public exploit code is known, yet the risk is significant because the flaw can be leveraged to probe internal services.
Affected Products — Airbyte (any deployment that includes the SharePoint connector).
Why It Matters for Trust & Control Assurance
- Input validation control – The flaw highlights a missing URI‑validation control, a core objective across SOC 2, ISO 27001, NIST CSF and other frameworks.
- Continuous evidence – Detecting SSRF attempts requires logging and monitoring that feed into a defensible audit trail, proving due‑diligence to auditors and customers.
- Third‑party component oversight – Connectors are third‑party code; their security posture must be continuously verified, a key element of a robust vendor‑risk program.
Recommended Actions
- Apply any patch or mitigation released by Airbyte immediately.
- If a patch is unavailable, disable the SharePoint connector or restrict its network egress with firewall rules.
- Implement strict URI‑validation in custom connectors and add SSRF detection signatures to your IDS/IPS.
- Enrich Airbyte logs with request‑origin data and enable centralized log aggregation for continuous monitoring.
- Conduct a focused code‑review of all third‑party connectors against your input‑validation control objectives.